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Abstract
Religious believers intuitively conceptualize deities as intentional agents with mental states who anticipate and respond to
human beliefs, desires and concerns. It follows that mentalizing deficits, associated with the autistic spectrum and also
commonly found in men more than in women, may undermine this intuitive support and reduce belief in a personal God.
Autistic adolescents expressed less belief in God than did matched neuro-typical controls (Study 1). In a Canadian student
sample (Study 2), and two American national samples that controlled for demographic characteristics and other correlates
of autism and religiosity (Study 3 and 4), the autism spectrum predicted reduced belief in God, and mentalizing mediated
this relationship. Systemizing (Studies 2 and 3) and two personality dimensions related to religious belief, Conscientiousness
and Agreeableness (Study 3), failed as mediators. Mentalizing also explained the robust and well-known, but theoretically
debated, gender gap in religious belief wherein men show reduced religious belief (Studies 2–4).
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Introduction
Belief in God and other supernatural agents is culturally and
historically widespread, and is a deeply affecting aspect of human
life [1]. Yet relatively little is known about the cognitive
foundations of these complex sociocultural beliefs. Believers
intuitively treat gods as intentional agents with mental states
who enter into social relationships with humans, using supernat-
ural powers to assuage existential concerns, respond to human
desires, and monitor their social behaviour [1–5]. Cognitive
theories therefore converge on the hypothesis that supernatural
agent beliefs are partly rooted in ordinary human social cognition.
Specifically, the social-cognitive capacity to represent and reason
about minds-termed mentalizing, theory of mind, or mind
perception [6,7] -also enables the mental representation of God
and other supernatural agents [2,7]. If mentalizing supports the
mental representation of supernatural agents, then mentalizing
deficits associated with the autistic spectrum and also commonly
found in men more than in women [6,8,9] may undermine
intuitive support for supernatural agent concepts and reduce belief
in God [1,10–13]. Here we examine the hypothesis-long
predicted, though currently untested- that mentalizing deficits
constrain belief in God.
In neuroimaging studies, thinking about [14] and praying to
[15] God activates brain regions implicated in mentalizing; thus
mentalizing might be a necessary component of belief in God,
without being a sufficient cause. When adults form inferences
about God’s mind, they show the same mentalizing biases that are
typically found when reasoning about other peoples’ minds [16–
18]. Developmentally, children’s reasoning about God’s mental
states, and about other non-physical agents, tracks the cognitive
development of mentalizing tendencies [19,20]. Finally, mentaliz-
ing is deficient at higher levels of the autism spectrum [8,9,21,22],
and interestingly men are both more likely to score high on the
autism spectrum [23] and more likely to be non-believers [24–26].
These lines of evidence suggest that mentally representing
supernatural beings (and their mental states) requires mentalizing
capacities. This in turn implies that mentalizing deficits would
constrain intuitive support for belief in God. Recent unpublished
findings by Caldwell-Harris, Murphy, Velazquez, and McNamara
(2011) provide some indirect support to this line of reasoning.
Adults who reported being diagnosed with autism spectrum
disorder were more likely than a neuro-typical comparison group
to self-identify as atheist and less likely to belong to an organized
religion.
The Present Research
We used an individual differences approach to test three
interrelated cognitive hypotheses: 1) the autistic spectrum is
inversely related to belief in God, 2) mentalizing mediates this
relation, and 3) mentalizing mediates the long-known, but
theoretically ambiguous, gender gap wherein men show reduced
religious belief than women. Study 1 compared religious belief in
a sample of adolescents with clinical diagnoses of autism with
a neuro-typical sample matched on relevant socio-demographic
characteristics. Studies 2–4 replicated and extended our findings to
three distinct non-clinical samples that measured autism as
a continuous variable rather than as a clinical diagnosis. These
studies also enabled formal mediation analyses, in which we tested
our hypotheses with multiple mediation bootstrapping based on
9999 resamples [27], an analytic technique for simultaneously
testing multiple potential mediators (thus avoiding the inferential
pitfalls of sequential analyses). In all analyses where gender was
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 May 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 5 | e36880included, it was coded (female=0, male=1), and all other
variables were standardized. Studies 2–4 also controlled for
additional socio-demographic and psychological variables related
to autism, mentalizing, and religiosity that addressed several
alternative explanations, which we evaluate in the General
Discussion.
Ethics Statement
For Studies 2–4, approval was obtained from the Behavioral
Research Ethics Board (BREB) at the University of British
Columbia, and all participants provided written informed consent
(for participants who completed the study via the internet, consent
was provided by clicking a designated button online; this was
approved by the UBC BREB). For Study 1, the parent was given
a letter of information and signed a written consent form and the
child was given an assent form to read and sign. Approval for the
study was obtained from the University of Western Ontario
Research Ethics Board.
Results and Discussion
Study 1
In a logistic regression model with autism diagnosis and IQ
predicting belief in God, autistic participants were only 11% as
likely as neuro-typical controls to strongly endorse God, OR=.11,
95% CI=.01, .96, Wald=3.98, p=.046, and IQ was unrelated to
belief, OR=1.01, 95% CI=.96, 1.06, Wald=.22, p=.64.
This study allowed comparison of individuals with autism
diagnoses with a matched control group, but the small sample size
rendered statistical mediation testing unfeasible. As an alternative,
we entered IQ and parental ratings of adolescent mentalizing
tendencies (the two were uncorrelated r=.15, p=.50) as in-
dependent predictors of belief in God. In this logistic regression
model, only mentalizing was a significant predictor: for each
standard deviation decrease in mentalizing, participants were only
21% as likely to strongly endorse God, OR=.21, 95% CI=.06,
.73, Wald=6.07, p=.01, and again IQ was not a significant
predictor, OR=1.03, 95% CI=.98, 1.08, Wald=.96, p=.33.
Study 2
Study 2 utilized a Canadian student sample and measured belief
in God, a standard self-report measure of the autism spectrum,
and both mentalizing (The Empathy Quotient) and systemizing
[28] as potential mediators. Empathy has been used extensively to
detect individual differences in adult mentalizing tendencies,
including perspective taking, interest in others’ beliefs and desires,
and understanding emotions. It is inversely correlated with autism
and with being male [8,28]. Systemizing assesses individual
differences in abilities and interests concerning physical and rule-
based systems. Because systemizing is positively correlated with
autism and with being male [28], but is typically orthogonal to
mentalizing, it was included as a second potential mediator.
Neither mentalizing nor systemizing has religious content or share
conceptual resemblance with the belief in God measure. We tested
our two primary hypotheses with autism and gender (respectively)
predicting belief in God, and mentalizing (Empathy) and
systemizing as potential mediators.
First, we tested our autism-related hypothesis (Fig. 1A). As
hypothesized, higher autism scores predicted lower belief in God,
b=2.13, p=.02 (controlling for gender). Critically, as predicted,
mentalizing significantly mediated this relationship, bMentalizingIn-
direct=2.07, 95% CI=2.14, 2.01. Systemizing was not a signif-
icant mediator, bSystemizingIndirect=.00, 95% CI=2.007, .009.
We next examined the effect of gender (Fig. 1B). Consistent with
past research, there was a trend for men to report weaker belief in
God than women (controlling for the autism spectrum), b=2.21,
p=.08 (this gender gap was significant at p=.05 when autism was
not controlled). As hypothesized, there was a significant indirect
effect, such that men were lower in mentalizing, and in turn lower
mentalizing predicted lower belief in God, bMentalizingIndirect=.04,
95% CI=.003, .103; there was no significant indirect effect for
systemizing, bSystemizingIndirect=2.001, 95% CI=2.086, .084,
even though gender more strongly predicted systemizing (b=.71)
than mentalizing (b=2.21).
Study 3
Study 3 replicated and extended findings from Study 2 to
a broad national sample of American adults, controlled for a range
of covariates of the autism spectrum and religious belief, and used
an alternative measure of belief in and a personal relationship with
God. We again tested mentalizing (The Empathy Quotient) and
systemizing as mediators. In addition, we measured and tested two
additional potential mediators. Two of the five basic facets of
personality [29], Conscientiousness and Agreeableness, are re-
liably related to religious belief and involvement in both previous
research [30,31] and also in the current sample. Therefore it is
plausible that they could also explain links between autism or
gender and belief in God.
In a logistic regression model with autism spectrum predicting
belief in a personal God, controlling for gender, age, educational
attainment, income, and frequency of religious attendance, for
each standard deviation increase in autism scores, participants
were only 80% as likely to strongly endorse a personal God,
OR=.80, 95% CI=.66, .97, Wald=5.25, p=.02. Mentalizing
emerged again as a significant mediator of this relationship,
bMentalizingIndirect=2.20, 95% CI=2.37, 2.04, while systemizing
did not, bSystemizingIndirect=2.007, 95% CI=2.03, .008 (Fig. 2A).
Furthermore, neither of the two personality measures were
significant mediators, bConscientiousnessIndirect=2.02, 95%
CI=2.07, .02, bAgreeablenessIndirect=2.10, 95% CI=2.20, .004.
In a separate logistic regression model, men were only 60% as
likely to report strong belief in a personal God as women,
controlling for the autism spectrum, age, income, educational
attainment, and frequency of religious attendance, OR=.60, 95%
CI=.41, .89, Wald=6.55, p=.01. Replicating the pattern from
Study 2, there was a significant indirect effect such that men were
lower in mentalizing, and in turn lower mentalizing scores
predicted lower belief in a personal God, bMentalizingIndirect=2.15,
95% CI=2.28, 2.06 (Fig. 2B); there was no significant indirect
effect for any other potential mediator, bSystemizingIndirect=2.007,
95% CI=2.03, .008, bConscientiousnessIndirect=2.02, 95%
CI=2.07, .02, bAgreeablenessIndirect=2.10, 95% CI=2.20, .004.
It was noteworthy that systemizing again failed as a mediator of
the gender effect, despite the fact that, once again, gender more
strongly predicted systemizing (b=.62) than mentalizing (b=2.33)
(Fig. 2B).
Finally, in a comprehensive logistic regression model predicting
high belief in a personal God, including all predictors (autism and
gender), covariates (age, education, income, religious attendance),
and potential mediating variables (mentalizing, systemizing,
Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness), mentalizing emerged as
a specific, independent, and robust predictor of belief in a personal
God, OR=1.41, Wald=6.01, p=.01 (Table 1). Older age and
religious attendance also independently predicted belief in God;
Agreeableness and systemizing were statistically marginal pre-
dictors (Table 1).
Mentalizing and Belief in God
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Study 4 again replicated our findings in another national, broad
sample of American adults, and controlled for four different
covariates (age, education, frequency of religious attendance, and
a new 3-item measure of interest in math, science, and
engineering, or IMSE). In addition to the Empathy Quotient,
we added a second distinct measure of mentalizing-the perfor-
mance-based Reading the Mind in the Eyes or Mindreading task
[32].
In a logistic regression model, the autistic spectrum inversely
predicted belief in God, controlling for gender and the four
covariates: for each standard deviation increase in autism scores,
participants were only 66% as likely to strongly endorse God,
OR=.66, 95% CI=.53, .84, Wald=12.11, p=.001. The two
distinct mentalizing measures significantly and independently
mediated this relationship: bEmpathyIndirect=2.25, 95%
CI=2.41, 2.10, and bMindreadingIndirect=2.07, 95% CI=2.14,
2.02 (Fig. 3A).
A gender gap was again observed: men were 47% as likely as
women to strongly endorse God, OR=.47, 95% CI=.30, .75,
Wald=10.07, p=.002, controlling for all four covariates and the
autism spectrum. As hypothesized, both mentalizing measures
independently mediated this gender effect: bEmpathyIndirect=.27,
95% CI=.12, .45, and bMindreadingIndirect=.11, 95% CI=.02, .25
Figure 1. Study 2: Mentalizing, but not systemizing, mediated the effects of both autism spectrum (A) and gender (B) on belief in
God (N=327). {p,.10, *p,.05, **p,.01, ***p,.001. Note. OR=odds ratio; b=standardized beta; b=unstandardized beta. Values in parentheses are
mediated effects. Autism Analysis Covariate: Gender. Gender Analysis Covariate: Autism Spectrum.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036880.g001
Figure 2. Study 3: Mentalizing, but not systemizing, mediated the effects of both autism spectrum (A) and gender (B) on belief in
a personal God (N=706). *p,.05, **p,.01, ***p,.001. Note. OR=odds ratio; b=standardized beta; b=unstandardized beta. Agreeableness, or
Conscientiousness (not shown) also failed as mediators. Values in parentheses are mediated effects. Autism Analysis Covariates: Gender, Age,
Education, Income, Religious attendance. Gender Analysis Covariates: Autism Spectrum, Age, Education, Income, Religious attendance.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036880.g002
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mentalizing measures emerged as significant predictors. Lower
education and religious attendance also independently predicted
belief in God (Table 2).
General Discussion
We found new evidence for an inverse link between the autism
spectrum and belief in God that was explained by mentalizing, as
predicted by cognitive theories of religion [10–13]. Mentalizing
also explained the widely observed [24] gender gap in religious
belief. Our findings should be interpreted with some caution;
although the results held controlling for several key socio-
demographic characteristics, further research conducted in other
cultural contexts should assess generalizability of findings [33].
Most of the measures were self-report (or observer-report in Study
1), which are known to have their limitations. Moreover, the
correlational natures of the observations are another limitation
and preclude definite causal inferences without further experi-
mental research. Nevertheless, results were robust to various
methodological checks, including different sampling strategies,
alternative measures of autism, mentalizing, and religious belief,
and the inclusion of several theoretically relevant control variables
addressing several alternative accounts.
Specifically, one alternative is that high levels of autism cause
adjustment difficulties in social situations, leading to lower levels of
religious attendance, which in turn reduce religious belief.
Contrary to this prediction, the effect of autism on belief in God
remained significant after controlling for religious attendance
(Studies 3–4), and disappeared only after controlling for mentaliz-
ing. This demonstrates that the effect of autism on belief exists
even after removing the considerable overlap between belief in
God and religious attendance. Relatedly, the relationship between
the autism spectrum and belief cannot be solely a by-product of
Table 1. Logistic Regression Model Predicting High Belief in
God (Study 3, N=706).
Variable
odds
ratio 95% CI Wald P
Mentalizing (Empathy Quotient) 1.41 1.07–1.86 6.01 .01
Systemizing .83 .66–1.03 2.93 .09
Agreeableness 1.26 .98–1.61 3.23 .07
Conscientiousness 1.14 .91–1.43 1.30 .25
Autism Spectrum (mediated) 1.09 .85–1.39 .51 .42
Gender (female vs. male) (mediated) .78 .50–1.22 1.14 .29
Education .94 .76–1.16 .36 .55
Income .88 .71–1.10 1.17 .28
Age 1.38 1.11–1.70 8.66 .003
Rel. Attendance 5.53 4.24–7.20 160.36 .0001
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036880.t001
Figure 3. Study 4: Two distinct measures of mentalizing mediated the effects of both autism spectrum (A) and gender (B) on belief
in God (N=452). *p,.05, **p,.01, ***p,.001. Note. OR=odds ratio; b=standardized beta; b=unstandardized beta. Values in parentheses are
mediated effects. Autism Analysis Covariates: Gender, Age, Education, Religious attendance, Interest in math, science, engineering. Gender Analysis
Covariates: Autism Spectrum, Age, Education, Religious attendance, Interest in math, science, engineering.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036880.g003
Table 2. Logistic Regression Model Predicting High Belief in
God (Study 4, N=452).
Variable
odds
ratio 95% CI Wald P
Mentalizing I (Empathy Quotient) 1.64 1.24–2.19 11.79 .001
Mentalizing II (Mindreading) 1.39 1.09–1.79 6.92 .009
Autism Spectrum (mediated) .89 .68–1.17 .68 .41
Gender (female vs. male) (mediated) .67 .40–1.09 2.62 .11
Education .80 .63–1.01 3.52 .06
Age 1.13 .90–1.42 1.15 .28
Rel. Attendance 3.68 2.82–4.79 92.63 .0001
Interest in Math, Science, Engineering 1.02 .80–1.31 0.03 .85
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036880.t002
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identical patterns emerged when autism was measured as
a continuous variable in a non-clinical sample of university
students sharing similar social circumstances (Study 2).
A second possible alternative is reverse-causation: that religious
involvement somehow causes higher levels of mentalizing, which
in turn predict low scores on the autism spectrum. One causal path
for this alternative is that belief in God encourages greater social
involvement in religious groups and activities, which in turn
increases mentalizing tendencies and decreases the likelihood of
being on the autism spectrum. This interpretation did not receive
support in two studies, because holding constant frequency of
religious attendance did not eliminate the effect of mentalizing on
belief in God. Moreover, it fails to account for the gender findings
(belief in God cannot cause gender), whereas the mentalizing
hypothesis parsimoniously explains both the autism and gender
effects. Another reverse-causation pathway is that religious in-
volvement leads to greater levels of mentally-simulated social
engagement with supernatural agents believed to have elaborate
mental states, which in turn encourages more mentalizing, and
lower autism scores. Future research could test this hypothesis, but
we note that this alternative pathway is compatible with the
hypothesis that mentalizing deficits constrain religious belief.
Third, it is possible that the autism spectrum is associated with
interest in math, science, and engineering (IMSE), which in turn
reduces religious belief. However, Study 4 statistically controlled
for IMSE, which did not independently predict belief in God
(Table 2). Similarly, systemizing, a variable closely linked to IMSE,
failed as a mediator (Studies 2–3). Fourth, the link between autism
and low belief in God was not explained by general intelligence:
autism remained a significant predictor of low belief in God even
after statistically controlling for IQ (Study 1), and education
(Studies 3–4), which is typically correlated with IQ. Fifth, the two
basic personality dimensions that are most reliably predictive of
religiosity, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness [30], similarly
failed as mediators.
Cognitive approaches to religion emphasize that a reliably
developing social cognitive mechanism-mentalizing or theory of
mind-is a key foundation that supports the intuitive understanding
of God or gods. Present findings bolster this hypothesis, and
further demonstrate that mentalizing deficits undermine not only
intuitive understanding of God, but belief as well. Furthermore,
these findings suggest one reason why, despite rich sociocultural
diversity, key aspects of religion reoccur across history and
cultures. Additionally, the robust gender gap in religious belief
has been recognized for decades, although its origins continue to
be vigorously debated [24–26]. Our findings contribute to this
debate by providing an important and previously overlooked
psychological explanation for the overrepresentation of men
among disbelievers.
Finally, we emphasize that our data do not suggest that religious
disbelief solely arises through mentalizing deficits; multiple
psychological and socio-cultural pathways likely lead to a complex
and over-determined phenomenon such as disbelief in God or
gods. Therefore, mentalizing deficits are one pathway among
several to disbelief. Analytic cognitive processing that suppresses or
overrides the intuitions that make theism cognitively compelling
[34] and exposure to secular cultural contexts lacking cues that
one should believe in God or gods [35] also likely promote
religious disbelief. In other words, the present results suggest that
disbelief can result from mentalizing deficits, but it can also arise
from multiple other sources, holding constant mentalizing
tendencies.
A complete scientific account of religious belief and disbelief
therefore requires consideration of not only cognitive under-
pinnings such as mentalizing and other core cognitive biases such
as dualistic intuitions and teleological or purpose-driven thinking
[12,36]. Equally important in explaining their cultural prevalence,
supernatural agent beliefs-once cognitively available-can be co-
opted for motivational and social functions, because of both their
palliative effects on existential anxieties [1] and their facilitative
effects on cooperation in large, anonymous groups in a cultural
evolutionary process [37,38]. Finally, the prevalence and content
of supernatural agent beliefs, although constrained by core social
cognitive capacities, respond to and fluctuate with socio-de-
mographic conditions across time and cultures [39]. Within this
broader theoretical landscape, these studies present new evidence
for a social cognitive mechanism underlying one source of
individual differences in religious belief.
Materials and Methods
Study 1
Participants. We recruited 12 autistic and 13 neuro-typical
adolescents from the same South Florida neighbourhood. Partic-
ipants were matched on key demographic and socio-economic
variables (see Table 3). One additional autistic participant was
excluded from analyses for failure to answer religious belief items.
Families of autism-diagnosed children were contacted through
local autism organizations. Autistic participants were diagnosed by
registered clinicians based on DSM-IV criteria and were free of
additional diagnoses.
Dependent Measure: Belief in God. Participants rated
their agreement (1–7) with four different statements (I believe in
God; When I am in trouble, I find myself wanting to ask God for
help. Reversed-coded items: When people pray they are only
talking to themselves; I don’t really spend much time thinking
about my religious beliefs). One additional item (‘‘I just don’t
understand religion’’) was dropped, because it correlated poorly
with the overall scale in this sample, leaving a four-item Intuitive
Belief in God scale (a=.65, M=5.03, SD=1.37). (Retaining this
item did not significantly alter the overall pattern of results). In
previous research [34], this measure correlated very highly with
other scales measuring religious devotion, such as the Intrinsic
Religiosity Scale [40] (r=.65, p,.001), and the Spiritual Well-
Being Scale [41] (r=.82, p,.001). Belief in God was non-normally
distributed and negatively skewed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov p=.08,
skewness=2.82). Therefore, this variable was median-dichoto-
mized into high believers (60%) and low believers (40%).
Predictor Measures: Autism, Mentalizing, and
IQ. Parents rated their adolescent child using the parental
version of the 50-item Autism Spectrum Quotient [23] (ASQ)
(a=.91, M=20.67, SD=11.67). Representative items from the
parental version of the ASQ: ‘‘S/he is fascinated by numbers,’’
‘‘S/he is good at social chit-chat’’ (reverse-scored). The autistic
group (M=30.82, SD=7.39) scored significantly higher on
parental ratings of autism than did the neuro-typical control
group (M=12.08, SD=6.42), t(22)=6.65, p=.0001, Cohen’s
d=2.84, validating the clinical diagnoses. Mentalizing was
assessed by the parents’ ratings of their child, using the short,
22-item version of the Empathy Quotient [28] (a=.97, M=17.50,
SD=12.75), which measures perspective taking, interest in in-
ferring others’ beliefs and desires, and understanding emotion.
Representative items from the parental version of the Empathy
Quotient: ‘‘My child often finds it difficult to judge if someone is
rude or polite’’ (reverse scored), ‘‘My child is good at un-
derstanding how others feel and what they are thinking.’’ We
Mentalizing and Belief in God
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Kauffman Brief Intelligence Test, 2
nd Edition [42], which consists
of both verbal and non-verbal subtests (M=92.31, SD=21.05).
None of the items in any of the predictor measures had any
religious content. Autism scores were not reliably associated with
IQ, r (25)=2.275, p=.19.
Study 2
Participants. In exchange for extra credit in psychology
courses, 327 Canadian students (MAge=20.0, 66% female)
completed a web-based questionnaire. For information about
participants’ religious backgrounds, see Table 4.
Dependent Measure: Belief in God. We used the same 5-
item belief in God measure used in Study 1 (a=.81, M=27.70,
SD=8.06). Participants rated their agreement (1–7) with five
different statements. Because the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is
oversensitive in large samples, we assessed normality with visual
inspection and other tests of normality (skewness=.08), which
indicated that this measure was approximately normally distrib-
uted in this sample. Predictor Measures: Autism Spectrum and Gender.I n
addition to gender, we measured the widely used Autism
Spectrum Quotient (a=.73, M=16.83, SD=5.96) a 50-item
questionnaire that detects normal individual differences in autism
for people having normal levels of intelligence [23]. Sample items:
‘‘I prefer to do things the same way over and over again.’’ ‘‘I am
fascinated by numbers.’’ ‘‘I find social situations easy’’ (reverse
scored).
Potential Mediators: Mentalizing and Systemizing. We
measured mentalizing with the short self-report version of the
Empathy Quotient [28] (22 items, a=.88, M=23.06, SD=7.75),
which assesses the ability to identify the mental states of others and
to react appropriately to them (sample items: ‘‘I often find it
difficult to judge if someone is rude or polite’’ (reverse scored). ‘‘I
am good at predicting how someone will feel.’’). We measured
systemizing with the short version of the Systemizing Quotient
[28] (25 items, a=.84, M=16.37, SD=7.99). This scale measures
aptitude for, and interest in, reasoning about mechanical and
physical objects and processes. Sample items: ‘‘I am fascinated by
how machines work.’’ ‘‘I find it difficult to understand information
Table 3. Demographic and socio-economic background information in Study 1.
Group Age Gender Race/ethnicity
Parents’ Religious
Affiliation Parents’ Education
Neuro-typical (n=13) M=12.6 12 Male 11 Caucasian 7 Protestant M=4.80
1 Female 1 Asian 3 Catholic
1 Hispanic 1 Catholic/Other
2 Jewish
Autistic (n=12) M=13.7 11 Male 11 Caucasian 2 Protestant M=4.90
1 Female 1 Hispanic 4 Catholic
3 Jewish
1 Jewish/Other
1 Other Religion
1 No Religion
Note. Parents’ education was defined as the average educational attainment of both parents (range 2–6; 2=some college, 3=college certificate, 4=some university,
5=university degree, 6=graduate degree). Parents’ Religious Affiliation refers to both parents’ stated religion.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036880.t003
Table 4. Demographic and socio-economic background information in Studies 2–4.
Study 2 Religious affiliations: Catholic and Protestant Christians (37.1%), Buddhists (5.4%), Muslims (2.9%), Atheists (13.7%), Agnostics (11.7%), participants
who listed ‘‘None’’ (26.0%), Hindus (.9%), Sikhs (2.0%), and one Jew (.3%).
(N=327)
Study 3 Religious affiliations: Catholic and Protestant Christian (48.5%), Jewish (2.5%), Buddhists (1.3%), Hindu (2%), Muslim (.7%), Atheists (11.6%), Agnostic
(14.2%), ‘‘None’’ (14%), and a variety of ‘‘Other’’ faiths (5.2%).
(N=706) Educational backgrounds: .8% less than high school, 10.8% high school or equivalent, 37.7% some university or college, 38.4% completed university or
college, 12.3% completed a postgraduate degree).
Ethnic/racial background: White/Caucasian (76%), African American (5.8%), Hispanic (5.7%), East Asian (4.6%), other (7.9%).
Reported annual income: range: ,$10 K–.$100 K, with the mean in the $30 K–$40 K range.
Religious attendance: (range: never – more often than weekly), with the median falling between once/twice per year and every other month.
Study 4 Religious affiliations: Christians (70%), Jews (4%), Buddhists (1%), Muslims (1%), Atheists (4%), Agnostics (5%), ‘‘Nones’’ (10%), and a variety of ‘‘Other’’
faiths (5%).
(N=452) Educational backgrounds: (3% less than high school, 20% high school or equivalent, 36% some university or college, 27% completed university or
college, 6% some postgraduate education, and 8% completed a postgraduate degree).
Religious attendance: ‘‘I attend church (or other religious services) often’’ (Range: 1–7, M=3.50, SD=2.42).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036880.t004
Mentalizing and Belief in God
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(reverse scored).
Study 3
Participants. A broad national sample of Americans was
drawn from a US-based online survey tool (Mechanical Turk,
Amazon.com). A total of 725 participants were recruited, however
incomplete data reduced the sample to N=706, Age: 18–88,
M=30.23, SD=10.65, 63% female. Participants came from all 50
states, and had diverse religious backgrounds, educational
attainment, levels of income, and levels of religious attendance
(see Table 4 for further demographic information).
Dependent Measure: Belief in a personal
God. Participants rated their agreement (0–6) with 10 items
selected from the previously validated and widely-used Spiritual
Well Being Scale [41]. These items measure belief in, and
a perceived relationship with, a personal God (a=.94, M=43.88,
SD=18.55). Representative items: ‘‘I have a personally meaning-
ful relationship with God,’’ ‘‘I believe that God is concerned about
my problems.’’ Reverse Scored: ‘‘I believe that God is impersonal
and not interested in my daily situations.’’ ‘‘I don’t find much
satisfaction in private prayer with God.’’ Visual inspection
revealed a bimodal distribution (Kurtosis=21.36). Therefore,
the measure was median-dichotomized into low believers (51.6%)
and high believes (48.4%).
Predictor Measures: Autistic Spectrum and Gender. In
addition to identifying their gender, participants completed the
same 50-item self-report version of the ASQ (a=.80, M=19.10,
SD=7.03).
Potential Mediators: Mentalizing, Systemizing,
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness. We measured mentaliz-
ing and systemizing with the same measures used in Study 2
(Empathy: a=.91, M=22.87, SD=9.46; systemizing: a=.87,
M=21.53, SD=9.60). Agreeableness and Conscientiousness were
measured using the relevant facets of a standard self-report
instrument measuring basic personality dimensions [29].
Control Measures. We measured age, educational attain-
ment, income level, and frequency of religious attendance. Older
age, lower educational attainment, and lower income are often
found to be associated with religious belief. The frequency of
religious attendance measure was included to subject our
hypotheses to a more stringent test, by disentangling belief in
God from an associated inclination towards religious social
participation.
Study 4
Participants. A broad national sample of 452 Americans
(Age: 18–84, M=43.06; 50.7% female) was drawn from a paid
subject pool administered by a US-based survey company (www.
Zoomerang.com). Although this was not a representative sample,
participants’ ethnic and religious backgrounds were roughly
similar to the general American population, and there was a wide
range of educational attainment and religious attendance (see
Table 4 for further socio-demographic background information).
Dependent Measure: Belief in God. The same 5-item scale
was used from Studies 1–2 (a=.82, M=25.71, SD=7.46). This
American sample yielded a markedly non-normal distribution of
belief in God scores, as levels of belief in God were generally high
(skewness=2.56, kurtosis=2.51). This variable was therefore
median-dichotomized into high believers (51% of sample) and low
believers (49% of sample).
Predictor Measures: Autistic Spectrum and Gender. In
addition to identifying their gender, participants completed the
same 50-item self-report version of the ASQ [23] (a=.71,
M=18.60, SD=6.04).
Potential Mediators: Mentalizing. First, participants again
completed the self-report version of the Empathy Quotient from
Studies 2–3 (a=.90, M=22.21, SD=8.85). Second, participants
completed the revised Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RME) task
[32] (a=.71, M=24.43, SD=4.91), which consists of a series of 36
pictures of peoples’ eyes. Participants are instructed to select which
of four words best describes what the person in the picture is
thinking or feeling. This task has been used to detect individual
differences in advanced adult mentalizing [32]. This latter
measure shares neither conceptual resemblance nor method
variance with the belief in God measure. The two mentalizing
measures were related, but by no means redundant, r (450)=.25,
p,.001, and served as independent potential mediators in
a multiple mediation model.
Control Measures. We again measured and controlled for
age, educational attainment, frequency of religious attendance,
and added a 3-item measure of interest in math, science, and
engineering (IMSE, a=.69, on a 1–7 scale). IMSE was included to
assess the possibility that the relationship between autism and
belief in God, or gender and belief in God, are byproducts of
greater levels of scientific interest among those high on the autism
spectrum.
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